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State v. Dist. Ct. (Pullin), 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (July 24, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF LAW 
 
Summary 
 
This case came to the Court on a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district 
court’s order sentencing the real party in interest pursuant to NRS 193.165 amendments, which 
were made affective after the crimes in question were committed. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The writ of mandamus was granted; and the district court was directed to enter an 
amended judgment of conviction that does not apply the retroactive changes to the statute. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
On September 2, 2006, defendant Pullin murdered Laurie Jean Lawrence using a firearm. 
Pullin pleaded guilty to that offense and the matter was set for sentencing. Prior to Pullin’s 
sentencing hearing on September 28, 2007, the Legislature enacted A.B. 510, which altered the 
sentencing scheme in NRS § 193.165 for the deadly weapon enhancement.  
Prior to sentencing, the parties submitted arguments concerning the application of these 
newly enacted amendments in the instant case. The district court determined that Pullin should 
be sentenced pursuant to the amendments. It then orally imposed a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for first degree murder, with a consecutive sentence of 8 to 20 years for the 
deadly weapon enhancement. The district court entered a judgment of conviction but altered the 
sentence for the deadly weapon enhancement from the oral pronouncement of 8 to 20 years to a 
term of 8 to 12 years. The State then filed the instant petition. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Court found that writ review was appropriate because the State does not have the 
right to appeal from a final judgment of conviction. The Court concluded that the petition for a 
writ presented important issues of law requiring clarification, and therefore exercised its 
discretion to intervene by way of the writ and addressed the petition’s merits. 
The amendments to NRS 193.165 
On June 14, 2007, the Legislature amended several statutes, including NRS § 193.165. 
Previously, NRS § 193.165 had required a defendant to serve an equal and consecutive sentence 
for the use of a deadly weapon in the commission a crime. The statute was amended to give 
district court judges broader discretion in sentencing, allowing them to impose a consecutive 
sentence with a minimum term of not less than one year and a maximum term of not more than 
20 years. The amendment was effective as of July 1, 2007, but the Legislature did not indicate 
whether the amendment would apply retroactively. 
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The Supreme Court agreed with the State that, because the Legislature had expressed no 
intent regarding the retroactivity of the statute, the district court erred when it sentenced Pullin 
under the amended statute. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed that “unless the Legislature clearly 
expresses its intent to apply a law retroactively, Nevada law requires the application of the law in 
effect at the time of the commission of a crime.”2 
Statutory retroactivity under Nevada case law 
The Court supported its general rule that a statute is not retroactive absent a clear 
expression of intent by the Legislature with previous Nevada case law. In Tellis v. State3, the 
defendant argued for application of the statute in effect at the time of his conviction and 
sentencing, as opposed to the stricter statute in effect at the time of the commission of the 
offense.4 The Court held in that case that the general savings clause set forth in NRS 193.130 
prevented the defendant from being sentenced under amendments enacted after he committed his 
crime.5 
Similarly, in Sparkman v. State6, the defendant challenged his sentence, which would 
have been the prescribed sentence in effect at the time he committed the subject offense and 
instead sought to be sentenced under the amended statute.7 Again, the Court reiterated the 
general rule that “the proper penalty is that in effect at the time of the commission of the offense” 
absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.8 Despite this general rule, the Court found that the 
district court erred in sentencing the defendant based on the previous version of the statute 
because the newly enacted amendment specifically indicated that it was to be applied 
retroactively (as distinguished from the present case).9 
Finally, in Castillo v. State10, the Court declined to apply amendments made to NRS § 
62.080 retroactively.11 The Court noted that “[i]n Nevada and neighboring jurisdictions, changes 
in statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent clear legislative intent to apply a statute 
retroactively.”12 
The Court determined that these cases show continued adherence to the general rule in 
Nevada regarding statute retroactivity.   
Public policy considerations 
The Court further agreed with the State’s argument that “retroactive application of 
criminal statutes violates important public policy considerations.”13  This is because “it is 
irrational to have a sentencing scheme whereby defendants could benefit by manipulating the 
                                                 
2 State v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (July 24, 2008). 
3 Tellis v. State, 445 P.2d 938 (1968). 
4 Id. at 941. 
5 Id. 
6 Sparkman v. State, 590 P.2d 151 (1979). 
7 Id. at 155. 
8 Id. at 155-56 (citing Tellis, 445 P.2d at 938). 
9 Sparkman, 590 P.2d at 156. 
10 Castillo v. State, 874 P.2d 1252 (1994), disapproved on other grounds by Wood v. State, 892 P.2d 944, 946 
(1995). 
11 Id. at 1256. 
12 Id. 
13 State v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (July 24, 2008). 
date of their sentencing hearings or by becoming fugitives from justice.”14 Thus, public policy 
concerns were also behind the Court’s decision to reiterate that amendments to criminal statutes 
do not apply retroactively in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 
Retroactive application of procedural statutes 
The defendant relied on a Michigan case, People v. Miller15, for the proposition that the 
general rule should not be applied in his case because statutes that are remedial or procedural in 
nature may be applied retroactively.16 The Court rejected this argument based on Castillo, where 
it had observed that it had previously declined to apply procedural rules prospectively unless the 
rules were of a constitutional dimension.17 Here, the amendments to NRS § 193.165 in question 
were not of a constitutional dimension, but rather served to merely give the district court 
additional discretion in sentencing. 
The applicability of the general rule to sentence enhancements 
Pullin further contended that the general rule did not apply because his case involved a 
sentence enhancement, while previous cases dealt with changes in the sentencing scheme for 
primary offenses. He suggested that his sentence enhancement be treated differently because the 
enhancement does not create a separate offense, but rather provides an additional penalty for the 
primary offense. The Court disagreed, stating that “[t]he mere fact that NRS 193.165 does not 
create a separate offense does nothing to alter the fact that the deadly weapon enhancement is an 
additional punishment for using a deadly weapon in the commission of the primary 
offense.”18 The Court concluded that the penalty for the use of a deadly weapon should be the 
one in effect at the time the defendant used the weapon to commit the primary offense because 
that is when the wrongdoing supporting the enhancement occurred. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court found that crimes are punishable in accord with the law in 
force at the time the crime is committed, so long as the Legislature does not express its clear 
intent otherwise. Thus, the district court erroneously sentenced Pullin pursuant to the amended 
provisions of NRS 193.165, which did not take effect until after the time the crime was 
committed. The Court instructed the district court to sentence Pullin pursuant to the law in effect 
at the time the offense was committed. 
Therefore, the petition was granted. The Court further instructed the clerk of the court to 
issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to conduct a new sentencing hearing 
pursuant to its opinion. 
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16 State v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (July 24, 2008). 
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18 State v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (July 24, 2008). 
